Strengthening the Economic Union: The Charter and the Agreement on Internal Trade

Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 52-59, 2002

8 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2010 Last revised: 11 Sep 2017

See all articles by Sujit Choudhry

Sujit Choudhry

Center for Constitutional Transitions; Center for Global Constitutionalism, WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Date Written: 2002

Abstract

The standard story in public policy and constitutional circles on the relationship between the Constitution and the Canadian Economic Union is a story of constitutional failure: that the Constitution has proven to be ineffective at furthering the integration of the Canadian economy. As a consequence, securing this goal requires either constitutional amendment or, in the face of the impossibility of large-scale constitutional change, the use of non-constitutional policy instruments such as the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), an intergovernmental agreement designed to remove barriers to interprovincial economic mobility. In this paper, I challenge this view. My argument is that constitutional litigation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom’s mobility rights provisions can serve as an effective alternative to the various mechanisms (adjudication and negotiation) established under the AIT to further the integration of the Canadian economy. Moreover, I suggest how constitutional litigation can actually strengthen the AIT, rather than simply serve as an alternative to it.

Suggested Citation

Choudhry, Sujit, Strengthening the Economic Union: The Charter and the Agreement on Internal Trade (2002). Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 52-59, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624052

Sujit Choudhry (Contact Author)

Center for Constitutional Transitions ( email )

HOME PAGE: constitutionaltransitions.org

Center for Global Constitutionalism, WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin, 10785
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
23
Abstract Views
453
PlumX Metrics