School Accountability and Teacher Mobility

42 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2010

See all articles by Li Feng

Li Feng

Texas State University

David N. Figlio

Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Tim R. Sass

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Date Written: June 2010

Abstract

This paper presents the first causal evidence on the effects of school accountability systems on teacher labor markets. We exploit a 2002 change in Florida's school accountability system that exogenously shocked some schools to higher accountability grades and others to lower accountability grades, and measure whether teachers in shocked schools are more or less likely to move. Using microdata from the universe of Florida public school teachers, we find strong evidence that accountability shocks influence the teacher labor market; specifically, teachers are more likely to leave schools that have been downward shocked -- especially to the bottom grade -- and they are less likely to leave schools that have been upward shocked. We also find that accountability shocks influence the distribution of the measured quality of teachers (in terms of value added measures) who stay and leave their school, though the average differences are not large.

Suggested Citation

Feng, Li and Figlio, David N. and Sass, Tim, School Accountability and Teacher Mobility (June 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w16070. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624111

Li Feng (Contact Author)

Texas State University ( email )

601 University Drive
San Marcos, TX 78666-4616
United States
512-245-8462 (Phone)
512.245.3089 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://uweb.txstate.edu/~lf20/

David N. Figlio

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Tim Sass

Georgia State University - Andrew Young School of Policy Studies ( email )

Department of Economics
35 Broad Street, 6th Floor
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States
404-413-0150 (Phone)
404-413-0145 (Fax)

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