Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey

Posted: 14 Jun 2010

See all articles by Oliver Budzinski

Oliver Budzinski

Ilmenau University of Technology

Isabel Ruhmer

University of Mannheim - Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics and Management (CDSEM)

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Date Written: June 2010

Abstract

Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation models (MSMs) in merger-control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, still a very young and innovative instrument of antitrust, and, therefore, its “technical” potential is far from being comprehensively exploited, and teething problems in its practical use in the antitrust environment prevail. We provide a classification of state-of-the-art MSMs and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the problems and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In summary, MSMs represent an important and valuable extension of the toolbox of merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic bullet and must be combined with other more traditional instruments of competition policy to comprehensively unfold its beneficial effects.

Keywords: L40, C15, K21

Suggested Citation

Budzinski, Oliver and Ruhmer, Isabel, Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey (June 2010). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 277-319, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624147 or http://dx.doi.org/nhp014

Oliver Budzinski

Ilmenau University of Technology ( email )

Ilmenau, D-98684
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tu-ilmenau.de/wth

Isabel Ruhmer

University of Mannheim - Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics and Management (CDSEM) ( email )

Mannheim, D-68131
Germany

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