Assessing the Effects of a Road-Surfacing Cartel in Switzerland

Posted: 14 Jun 2010

See all articles by Kai Hüschelrath

Kai Hüschelrath

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Nina Leheyda

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Patrick Beschorner

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2010

Abstract

The paper assesses the impact of the detection of a hard-core cartel in the Swiss market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addition to an investigation of supply-side factors, demand-side factors, and market prices, the paper also derives estimates of the economic effects of the Swiss Competition Commission's decision in the road-surfacing cartel case. The results indicate that the detection of the cartel may have led to short-term price reductions; however, the persistent collusion-friendly industry structure forecloses larger and durable gains for the customers.

Keywords: L41, K21

Suggested Citation

Hüschelrath, Kai and Leheyda, Nina and Beschorner, Patrick, Assessing the Effects of a Road-Surfacing Cartel in Switzerland (June 2010). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 335-374, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624150 or http://dx.doi.org/nhp018

Kai Hüschelrath (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Nina Leheyda

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Patrick Beschorner

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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