Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers

Cory S. Capps

Bates White, LLC

June 2010

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 375-391, 2010

In light of recent increased policy attention directed toward health insurance, the next significant health plan merger is almost certain to receive close scrutiny from many quarters, including representatives of providers, such as the American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association, and the U.S. Department of Justice. In this paper, I review the key buy-side economic questions and analytic frameworks that are likely to be at the forefront in future investigations of health plan mergers. In particular, I explain how industry structure implies that shares of purchases from individual providers as well as area-wide shares of purchases are likely to inform antitrust analysis of potential monopsony harm in health plan mergers. I also discuss the appropriate treatment of government payers in calculating and assessing buy-side market shares. I conclude with a discussion of how competition and market power in downstream markets for the sale of commercial insurance interact with the potential exercise of monopsony power in upstream markets for the purchase of provider services.

Keywords: I11, K21, L40

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Date posted: June 14, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Capps, Cory S., Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers (June 2010). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 375-391, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624152 or http://dx.doi.org/nhp020

Contact Information

Cory S. Capps (Contact Author)
Bates White, LLC ( email )
2001 K St., NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20006
United States
202.216.1151 (Phone)
202.408.7838 (Fax)
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