Project Financing Versus Corporate Financing Under Asymmetric Information

Journal of Business and Economics Research, Forthcoming

Posted: 15 Jun 2010

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 14, 2010

Abstract

In recent years financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by non-recourse debt has become an important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET, 1987) argue that project financing can be optimal when asymmetric information exists between firm's insiders and market participants. In contrast to that paper, we provide an asymmetric information argument for project financing without relying on corporate taxes, costly information production or an assumption that firms have the same mean of return. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding asset securitization.

Keywords: asymmetric information, non-recourse debt, project financing, asset securitization

JEL Classification: C72, D82, G29, G32, O220

Suggested Citation

Miglo, Anton, Project Financing Versus Corporate Financing Under Asymmetric Information (June 14, 2010). Journal of Business and Economics Research, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624927

Anton Miglo (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow ( email )

United Kingdom

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