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An Antitrust Analysis of the Federal Trade Commission’s Complaint Against Intel

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-27

ICLE Antitrust and Competition Policy White Paper Series, June 8, 2010

30 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2010  

Joshua D. Wright

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: June 14, 2010

Abstract

The Federal Trade Commission’s recent complaint targets the Intel Corporation for antitrust scrutiny under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Commission alleges that, through the use of loyalty discounts offered to microprocessor purchasers, Intel unlawfully excluded rivals and harmed consumers in the microprocessor and graphics processor markets. This article analyzes the Commission’s claims. The Commission’s reliance on Section 5 should be viewed with suspicion because it allows the Commission to evade the more stringent standards of proof that have been emerged in the Supreme Court’s Section 2 jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Commission’s actions surrounding its prosecution of Intel reflect an adversarial attitude that undermines the Commission’s stated comparative advantages over private litigants. Moreover, the Commission’s allegations form a weak case when evaluated under the conventional Section 2 standard. Unlike many Section 2 cases alleging speculative future consumer harm, the disputed conduct in this case has been in the marketplace for nearly a decade, and its competitive footprint is readily observable. The available data do not support the Commission’s theory that Intel’s behavior harmed consumers. To the contrary, it is almost certain that Intel’s distribution contracts led to tangible, demonstrable consumer welfare gains in the form of lower prices. Accordingly, the Commission’s complaint against Intel threatens to harm consumers directly in the computer industry as well as indirectly by undermining the stability and certainly which longstanding Section 2 jurisprudence has afforded the business community by requiring the plaintiffs offer rigorous proof of competitive harm.

Keywords: AMD, Brooke Group, CPU, Credit Suisse, error-cost framework, European Union, exclusive dealing, FTC, Frank Easterbrook, Kovacic, Linkline Communications, market share, monopolization, original equipment manufacturers, share-based discounts, Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court, Trinko, unfair competition

JEL Classification: D11, D18, F13, K21, L41

Suggested Citation

Wright, Joshua D., An Antitrust Analysis of the Federal Trade Commission’s Complaint Against Intel (June 14, 2010). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-27. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624943

Joshua D. Wright (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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