Investor Pricing of CEO Equity Incentives

Posted: 16 Jun 2010 Last revised: 24 Apr 2011

See all articles by Jeff P. Boone

Jeff P. Boone

University of Texas at San Antonio - Department of Accounting

Inder K. Khurana

University of Missouri at Columbia - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business

K. K. Raman

The University of Texas at San Antonio

Date Written: June 16, 2010

Abstract

The objective of CEO compensation is to better align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests that these incentives have a significant down-side(i.e., they motivate executives to manipulate reported earnings and lower information quality). Given the conflict between the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional information quality effect, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. We examine whether CEO equity incentives are priced in the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium over the 1992-2007 time period. Our analysis controls for two potential structural changes over this time period. The first is the 1995 Delaware Supreme Court ruling which increased protection from takeovers (and decreased risk) for Delaware incorporated firms. The second is the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act which impacted corporate risk taking, equity incentives, and earnings management. Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO equity incentives, despite being associated with lower information quality, increase firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.

Keywords: CEO Equity Incentives, Information Quality, Cost of Equity Capital

JEL Classification: M41, M52

Suggested Citation

Boone, Jeff P. and Khurana, Inder and Raman, K. K., Investor Pricing of CEO Equity Incentives (June 16, 2010). Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 417-435, April 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1625811

Jeff P. Boone

University of Texas at San Antonio - Department of Accounting ( email )

One UTSA Circle
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States

Inder Khurana

University of Missouri at Columbia - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business ( email )

331 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-3474 (Phone)
573-882-2437 (Fax)

K. K. Raman (Contact Author)

The University of Texas at San Antonio ( email )

One UTSA Circle
San Antonio, TX 78249
United States
210-458-8749 (Phone)

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