On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two-Person Cooperation Game

27 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2010 Last revised: 13 Jan 2011

See all articles by Sebastian J. Goerg

Sebastian J. Goerg

Florida State University - Department of Economics; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Gari Walkowitz

Technische Universität München (TUM) - School of Governance - Hochschule für Politik

Date Written: June 1, 2010

Abstract

In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.

Keywords: framing of decision problems, methodology, subject-pool di erences

JEL Classification: C72, C91, Z13, A13, F51

Suggested Citation

Goerg, Sebastian J. and Walkowitz, Gari, On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two-Person Cooperation Game (June 1, 2010). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2010/28. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1626159 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1626159

Sebastian J. Goerg

Florida State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Tallahassee, FL 30306-2180
United States
+1 (850) 644-7083 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.s-goerg.de

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de

Gari Walkowitz (Contact Author)

Technische Universität München (TUM) - School of Governance - Hochschule für Politik ( email )

Richard-Wagner-Str.1
Munich, 80333
Germany

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