Does Raiding Explain the Negative Returns to Faculty Seniority?

18 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2010

See all articles by Bernt Bratsberg

Bernt Bratsberg

Kansas State University - Department of Economics; University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

James F. Ragan

Kansas State University - Department of Economics

John T. Warren

Kansas State University - Department of Economics

Abstract

We track faculty for 30 yr at five PhD-granting departments of economics. Two-thirds of faculty who take alternative employment move downward; less than one-quarter moves upward. We find a substantial penalty for seniority, even after richly controlling for faculty productivity, and the penalty is little changed when we allow wages and returns to seniority to differ by mobility status. Faculty who end up moving to better or comparable positions were penalized as severely for seniority while they were in our sample as faculty who stay. These results are incompatible with the raiding hypothesis. Faculty from top 10 programs are also punished for seniority but to a lesser degree than other faculty, which could reflect reduced monopsony power against such faculty if they are more marketable. All results persist when we control for prospective publications and allow lower returns for older publications. Match-quality bias has dissipated in the post-internet period, which may be the consequence of greater availability of information.

Suggested Citation

Bratsberg, Bernt and Ragan, James F. and Warren, John T., Does Raiding Explain the Negative Returns to Faculty Seniority?. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 48, Issue 3, pp. 704-721, July 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1627407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00220.x

Bernt Bratsberg (Contact Author)

Kansas State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Manhattan, KS 66502-4001
United States

University of Oslo - Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research

Gaustadalleen 21
N-0349 Oslo
Norway

James F. Ragan

Kansas State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Manhattan, KS 66502-4001
United States

John T. Warren

Kansas State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Waters Hall 246
Manhattan, KS 66506-4001
United States

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