A Location Game on Disjoint Circles

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009

Posted: 4 Sep 2010 Last revised: 21 Dec 2010

See all articles by Marcin Dziubiński

Marcin Dziubiński

University of Warsaw - Institute of Informatics

Debabrata Datta

Institute of Management Technology, Ghaziabad

Jaideep Roy

Deakin University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1, 2009

Abstract

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N > K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face a resource mobility constraint such that not all N locations can be placed in the first round. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that for K = 1, the second mover always has a winning strategy in this game. In this paper we show that with K > 1, the second mover advantage disappears as in this case both players have a tying strategy. We also study a natural variant of this game where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so that in each round each player chooses a single location where we show that the second mover advantage re-appears. We suggest some Nash equilibrium configurations of locations in both versions of the game.

Keywords: Competitive locations, disjoint spaces, Winning/Tying strategies, equilibrium configurations

Suggested Citation

Dziubiński, Marcin and Datta, Debabrata and Roy, Jaideep, A Location Game on Disjoint Circles (December 1, 2009). International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1627940

Marcin Dziubiński (Contact Author)

University of Warsaw - Institute of Informatics ( email )

Banacha 2
Warsaw, 02-097
Poland

Debabrata Datta

Institute of Management Technology, Ghaziabad ( email )

Hapur Road
Rajnagar
Ghaziabad, UP 201001
India
00911203002298 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.imt.edu

Jaideep Roy

Deakin University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

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