On Cooperative Games Related to Market Situations and Auctions

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009

Posted: 22 Jun 2010

See all articles by Rodica Branzei

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences

Vito Fragnelli

University of Piemonte Orientale - Dip. di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate

Ana Meca

Miguel Hernandez University

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: December 1, 2009

Abstract

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers are known by all of them. Then two types of cooperative games, which we call market games and ring games, corresponding to such market situations are considered.

Market games are related to special total big boss games, while ring games are related to special convex games, the peer group games. It turns out that there exists a duality relation between the market game and the ring game arising from the same two-corner market situation. For both classes of games relevant solution concepts are studied.

Keywords: Market games, ring games, one-object auction situations, big boss games, peer group games

Suggested Citation

Branzei, Rodica and Fragnelli, Vito and Meca, Ana and Tijs, Stef H., On Cooperative Games Related to Market Situations and Auctions (December 1, 2009). International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1627943

Rodica Branzei

'A.l. Cuza' University of Iasi, Romania - Faculty of Computer Sciences ( email )

Carol I Blvd, Nr.11
Iasi
Romania

Vito Fragnelli

University of Piemonte Orientale - Dip. di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate ( email )

Via V. Bellini, 25/G
15100 Alessandria
Italy
+39+010+3536838 (Phone)
+39+010+3536752 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mfn.unipmn.it/~fragnell/

Ana Meca (Contact Author)

Miguel Hernandez University ( email )

Elche Campus, La Galia Building
Avda. del Ferrocarril, s/n
Elche, 03202
Spain

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
421
PlumX Metrics