The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation, and Cooperation

22 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2010 Last revised: 30 Oct 2010

Joel P. Trachtman

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Date Written: June 25, 2010

Abstract

This article develops an analytical template for examining the future of international financial crisis avoidance and management, focusing on certain areas of prudential financial regulation. This template examines questions of national regulatory policy reform, reasons for international cooperation, and problems of cross-functional fragmentation. In order for each state to reduce risk through regulatory reform, states must work together to avoid cross-border harms that are not fully taken into account in national decision-making, and to avoid detrimental regulatory competition. They must work together to make rules, but they must recognize that our vision of the future is limited, and so they must establish institutions that will allow them to revise rules, and institutions, as necessitated by unfolding change.

Keywords: financial regulation, financial crisis, bank regulation, securities regulation, international law, regulatory competition, regulatory jurisdiction

JEL Classification: E53, F30, F36, G18, K22, K23, K33, L51

Suggested Citation

Trachtman, Joel P., The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation, and Cooperation (June 25, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1630523 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1630523

Joel P. Trachtman (Contact Author)

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )

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