A General Class of Adaptive Strategies
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 373 & Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality DP No. 192
34 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 1999
Date Written: March 1999
We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no "regret." Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine ) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell ) are particular cases. The motivation and application of this work come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. The basic tool for the analysis is a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.
JEL Classification: C7, D7, C6
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation