A Selection-Corrected Estimate of Chevron’s Impact on Agency Deference
33 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2010 Last revised: 9 May 2011
Date Written: June 30, 2010
The ruling in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council dramatically changed how judges rule in favor of federal administrative agencies. Previous research has found both theoretically and empirically that Chevron favors agencies and their interpretation of statutes, but the magnitude of Chevron’s impact remains unclear due to possible selection issues biasing the post-Chevron world. I account for the possibility that incentives change both to the challenger of an agency and the agency itself post-Chevron by estimating a break in the trend of agency deference on the date Chevron was decided. This allows me to exploit the exogenous cases that were pending when Chevron was decided while still employing the full sample of rulings. Both parametric and nonparametric specifications of the trend in agency deference suggest that Chevron increased agency deference by about 20 percentage points.
Keywords: Chevron, Selection, Agency Deference
JEL Classification: K23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation