Constitutions and Credible Commitments: Estimating Capital Market Responses to Order and Law

Posted: 17 Jul 2010 Last revised: 21 Apr 2012

See all articles by Douglas M. Spencer

Douglas M. Spencer

University of Connecticut, School of Law

Date Written: July 2, 2010

Abstract

In this paper I examine the relationship between judicial independence and a country's bond market. Judicial independence is often celebrated both because it provides for the enforcement of economic promises between private parties and political bodies, and because it empowers courts to uphold constitutional commitments to political and civil liberties. Using publicly-available financial data and several measures of judicial independence in 69 countries, I measure the extent to which a highly independent judiciary attracts domestic and foreign investments in government and sovereign bonds. I find a strong correlation between a stable judiciary -- regardless of its independence -- and investment rates. In other words, a judicial independence score that is stable across time is a stronger predictor of investments than a judicial score that is relatively high. These findings tease out a subtle, yet more precise mechanism for the public choice theory of credible commitments.

Keywords: judicial independence, credible commitment, law and economics

JEL Classification: K11, K23, N10, F30, G15, H63

Suggested Citation

Spencer, Douglas M., Constitutions and Credible Commitments: Estimating Capital Market Responses to Order and Law (July 2, 2010). 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1634091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1634091

Douglas M. Spencer (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut, School of Law ( email )

65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
United States

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