Ignorance is not Always Bliss: Feedback and Dynamics in Public Good Experiments

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-64

29 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2010

See all articles by Maria Bigoni

Maria Bigoni

University of Bologna - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Sigrid Suetens

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics; Tilburg University

Date Written: July 3, 2010

Abstract

In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and earnings on the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual contributions or individual earnings. We find that, in the aggregate, contributions decline less fast when additional information about contributions and earnings is provided on top of aggregate information. We also find that there exist substantial but intuitively appealing differences in the way individuals react to feedback. Particularly, individuals with a high propensity to contribute tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more inclined to obtain feedback about individual contributions than about individual earnings than individuals with a lower propensity to contribute.

Keywords: voluntary contributions, experiment, repeated interaction, feedback, imitation

JEL Classification: C91, D74

Suggested Citation

Bigoni, Maria and Suetens, Sigrid, Ignorance is not Always Bliss: Feedback and Dynamics in Public Good Experiments (July 3, 2010). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-64. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1634835 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1634835

Maria Bigoni (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, Bologna 40126
Italy
+390512098134 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/maria.bigoni/en

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Sigrid Suetens

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerp, B-2000
Belgium
+32 3 220 40 38 (Phone)

Tilburg University

Postbus 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
75
Abstract Views
474
rank
314,930
PlumX Metrics