Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique Working Paper No. 1016
50 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2010
Date Written: June 1, 2010
In this paper, we investigate individuals’ investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others’ output and to artificially increase their own relative performance. In addition, stronger group identity favors positive rivalry and discourages sabotage among.
Keywords: Status Seeking, Rank, Competitive Preferences, Experiment
JEL Classification: C91, C92, M54, D63, J28, J31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation