44 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2010 Last revised: 14 Nov 2011
Date Written: November 3, 2011
This paper studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A theoretical model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive suggests that 1) in principle, excessive risk taking (in the form of risk shifting) may be addressed by basing compensation on both stock price and the price of debt (proxied by the credit default swap spread), but 2) shareholders may be unable to commit to designing compensation contracts in this way and indeed may not want to because of distortions introduced by either deposit insurance or naive debtholders. The paper then provides an empirical analysis that suggests that debt-like compensation for executives is believed by the market to reduce risk for financial institutions.
Keywords: executive compensation, risk taking
JEL Classification: G21, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bolton, Patrick and Mehran, Hamid and Shapiro, Joel D., Executive Compensation and Risk Taking (November 3, 2011). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 456. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1635349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1635349
By Kevin Murphy