Explaining Constitutional Review in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan

48 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2010

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Veronica Grembi

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM)

Shirley Ching Ping Lin

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: July 7, 2010

Abstract

This paper extends the empirical analysis of the determinants of judicial behavior by considering the Taiwanese case. Taiwan is a particularly interesting case because the establishment and development of constitutional review corresponds to a political transition from an authoritarian regime dominated by one party to an emerging democracy. We test the attitudinal hypothesis by making use of a new dataset of ninety-seven decisions issued by the Taiwanese constitutional court in the period 1988-2008. The attitudinal hypothesis is that the Taiwanese constitutional judges respond to party interests, either because their preferences coincide with the appointer or because they want to exhibit loyalty to the appointer. Our econometric analysis does not provide strong evidence for the attitudinal hypothesis. We provide an explanation. Faced with a transition from a one-party political regime to a democracy, the Taiwanese Grand Justices needed to assert their independence from the other branches of government and gain credibility, thus dissenting more often, periodically and individually voting against the interests of the dominant party.

Keywords: Constitutional court, Taiwan, concurring and dissenting opinions, party politics, transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Grembi, Veronica and Lin, Shirley Ching Ping, Explaining Constitutional Review in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan (July 7, 2010). Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, Forthcoming; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE10-014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1635942

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Veronica Grembi

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM) ( email )

Via Conservatorio, 7
Milan, 20122
Italy

Shirley Ching Ping Lin

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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