Strategic Sophistication of Adolescents: Evidence from Experimental Normal-Form Games

41 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2010

See all articles by Simon Czermak

Simon Czermak

Management Center Innsbruck (MCI)

Francesco Feri

University of London

Daniela Glätzle-Rützle

University of Innsbruck - Department of Public Finance

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Abstract

We examine the strategic sophistication of adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides making choices, subjects have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that choices are more often a best reply to beliefs if any player has a dominant strategy and equilibrium payoffs are not too unequal. Using a mixture model we can estimate for each subject the probability to be any of eight different strategic and non-strategic types. The econometric estimation reveals that older subjects are more likely to eliminate dominated strategies, and that subjects with good math grades are more strategic.

Keywords: strategic thinking, beliefs, experiment, age, adolescents

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Czermak, Simon and Feri, Francesco and Glätzle-Rützle, Daniela and Sutter, Matthias, Strategic Sophistication of Adolescents: Evidence from Experimental Normal-Form Games. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5049. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1638505

Simon Czermak (Contact Author)

Management Center Innsbruck (MCI) ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 15
Innsbruck, 6020
Austria

Francesco Feri

University of London ( email )

Senate House
Malet Street
London, WC1E 7HU
United Kingdom

Daniela Glätzle-Rützle

University of Innsbruck - Department of Public Finance ( email )

Innrain 52
Innsbruck, 6020
Austria

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Cologne, 50923
Germany

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