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Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement Using Resource-Based Evidence

23 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2010 Last revised: 5 Jan 2011

Dina I. Waked

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Sciences Po Law School

Date Written: July 12, 2010

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.

Keywords: Antitrust, Enforcement, Developing Countries

Suggested Citation

Waked, Dina I., Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement Using Resource-Based Evidence (July 12, 2010). 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1638874 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1638874

Dina I. Waked (Contact Author)

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Sciences Po Law School ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

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