Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Private Values
Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series No. 2056
15 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2010 Last revised: 29 Jul 2010
Date Written: February 1, 2010
A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and is not affected by the rule for resolving tied bids.
JEL Classification: C72, D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Wilson, Robert B. and Govindan, Srihari, Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Private Values (February 1, 2010). Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series No. 2056 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1639599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1639599
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