Download This PaperExistence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetic Bidders
Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series No. 2057
23 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2010 Last revised: 4 Aug 2010
Date Written: February 1, 2010
Abstract
For two symmetric bidders, weak monotonicity conditions are shown to imply existence of an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies for a sealed-bid first-price auction of an item for which each bidder's value depends on every bidder's observed signal. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and thus is unaffected by how tied bids are resolved.
Keywords: auctions
JEL Classification: C72, D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Govindan, Srihari and Wilson, Robert B., Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetic Bidders (February 1, 2010). Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series No. 2057, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1639615 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1639615
Robert B. Wilson (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-8620 (Phone)
650-725-7979 (Fax)
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Paper statistics
Downloads
69
Abstract Views
997
Rank
501,671
Recommended Papers
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.