Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetic Bidders

Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series No. 2057

23 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2010 Last revised: 4 Aug 2010

See all articles by Srihari Govindan

Srihari Govindan

University of Rochester

Robert Wilson

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: February 1, 2010

Abstract

For two symmetric bidders, weak monotonicity conditions are shown to imply existence of an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies for a sealed-bid first-price auction of an item for which each bidder's value depends on every bidder's observed signal. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and thus is unaffected by how tied bids are resolved.

Keywords: auctions

JEL Classification: C72, D44

Suggested Citation

Govindan, Srihari and Wilson, Robert B., Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Two Symmetic Bidders (February 1, 2010). Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series No. 2057, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1639615 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1639615

Srihari Govindan

University of Rochester ( email )

Department of Economics
Rochester, NY NY 14627
United States
5852757214 (Phone)

Robert B. Wilson (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-8620 (Phone)
650-725-7979 (Fax)

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