R&D Investments with Competitive Interactions

48 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2010 Last revised: 14 Jul 2021

See all articles by Kristian R. Miltersen

Kristian R. Miltersen

Copenhagen Business School

Eduardo S. Schwartz

Simon Fraser University (SFU); University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2004


In this article we develop a model to analyze patent-protected R&D investment projects when there is (imperfect) competition in the development and marketing of the resulting product. The competitive interactions that occur substantially complicate the solution of the problem since the decision maker has to take into account not only the factors that affect her/his own decisions, but also the factors that affect the decisions of the other investors. The real options framework utilized to deal with investments under uncertainty is extended to incorporate the game theoretic concepts required to deal with these interactions. Implementation of the model shows that competition in R&D, in general, not only increases production and reduces prices, but also shortens the time of developing the product and increases the probability of a successful development. These benefits to society are countered by increased total investment costs in R&D and lower aggregate value of the R&D investment projects.

Suggested Citation

Miltersen, Kristian Risgaard and Schwartz, Eduardo S. and Schwartz, Eduardo S., R&D Investments with Competitive Interactions (February 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1639777

Kristian Risgaard Miltersen (Contact Author)

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Solbjerg Plads 3
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000

Eduardo S. Schwartz

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-1953 (Phone)
310-206-5455 (Fax)

Simon Fraser University (SFU) ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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