Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics

33 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010

See all articles by Mark Gradstein

Mark Gradstein

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: May 2010

Abstract

This research shows that moral hazard associated with extant social insurance arrangements causes underinvestment in human capital, because of governmentÂ’s inability to commit to welfare policies. It then argues that education policies, such as education subsidies or direct public investment in education, may achieve a second best and also help alleviating the deterioration of work norms.

Keywords: education policies, moral hazard, social insurance

JEL Classification: H1, I22

Suggested Citation

Gradstein, Mark, Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics (May 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7838, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1640360

Mark Gradstein (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+97 2 8647 2288 (Phone)
+97 2 8647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
6
Abstract Views
518
PlumX Metrics