Social Insurance, Education, and Work Ethics
33 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010
Date Written: May 2010
Abstract
This research shows that moral hazard associated with extant social insurance arrangements causes underinvestment in human capital, because of governments inability to commit to welfare policies. It then argues that education policies, such as education subsidies or direct public investment in education, may achieve a second best and also help alleviating the deterioration of work norms.
Keywords: education policies, moral hazard, social insurance
JEL Classification: H1, I22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de
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