Matching with Trade-Offs: Revealed Preferences Over Competing Characteristics

68 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010

See all articles by Alfred Galichon

Alfred Galichon

NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute

Bernard Salanie

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2010

Abstract

We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on characteristics that the analyst does not observe. The social optimum must therefore trade off matching on incomes and matching on educations. Given a flexible specification of the surplus function, we characterize under mild assumptions the properties of the set of feasible matchings and of the socially optimal matching. Then we show how data on the covariation of the types of the partners in observed matches can be used to estimate the parameters that define social preferences over matches. We provide both nonparametric and parametric procedures that are very easy to use in applications.

Keywords: assignment, marriage, matching

JEL Classification: C13, C78, D61

Suggested Citation

Galichon, Alfred and Salanie, Bernard, Matching with Trade-Offs: Revealed Preferences Over Competing Characteristics (June 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7858, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1640380

Alfred Galichon (Contact Author)

NYU, Department of Economics and Courant Institute ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

Bernard Salanie

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences - Department of Economics ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
7
Abstract Views
1,968
PlumX Metrics