A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

7 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2010 Last revised: 26 Apr 2014

See all articles by Cédric Wasser

Cédric Wasser

University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics

Date Written: February 20, 2013

Abstract

The literature on imperfectly discriminating contests has almost exclusively focused on complete information. We study such contests assuming players have private information. We identify a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests for which findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. The main assumptions are that a player’s valuation of winning is increasing in the signal he observes and that a player’s probability of winning is continuous in the efforts of all players as well as increasing in his own effort.

Keywords: Contest, Imperfectly discriminating, Equilibrium existence, Private information, Interdependent values

JEL Classification: D72, D74, D82, C72

Suggested Citation

Wasser, Cédric, A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests (February 20, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1640515 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1640515

Cédric Wasser (Contact Author)

University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Peter Merian-Weg 6
Basel, 4002
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.cedricwasser.net

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