A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests
7 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2010 Last revised: 26 Apr 2014
Date Written: February 20, 2013
The literature on imperfectly discriminating contests has almost exclusively focused on complete information. We study such contests assuming players have private information. We identify a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests for which findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. The main assumptions are that a player’s valuation of winning is increasing in the signal he observes and that a player’s probability of winning is continuous in the efforts of all players as well as increasing in his own effort.
Keywords: Contest, Imperfectly discriminating, Equilibrium existence, Private information, Interdependent values
JEL Classification: D72, D74, D82, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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