Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 167 (2011)

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-33

17 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2010 Last revised: 19 Dec 2012

Samuel Issacharoff

New York University School of Law

Date Written: July 15, 2010

Abstract

Consumers make mistakes, and sophisticated market actors exploit those mistakes. Efforts to promote consumer protection through soft paternalistic interventions, most notably improved disclosure regimes, run into the problem that consumers are overwhelmed by information and may not to invest the time and effort necessary to take advantage of more information. This paper reviews recent attempts to protect consumers without recourse to command-and-control regulation. Instead of further overwhelming consumers with information, this paper proposes that efforts to aid beleaguered consumers should take the form of facilitating a market for intermediaries where independent agents or competitive firms have incentives to assist consumer protection.

JEL Classification: K12

Suggested Citation

Issacharoff, Samuel, Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection (July 15, 2010). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 167 (2011); NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-33. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1640624

Samuel Issacharoff (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6580 (Phone)
212-995-3150 (Fax)

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