58 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2010 Last revised: 14 Apr 2013
Date Written: July 16, 2010
Washington's `revolving door' -the movement from government service into the lobbying industry- is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
Keywords: Lobbying, Revolving Door, US Congress, Political Connections, Political Elites
JEL Classification: H11, J24, J45
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Blanes i Vidal, Jordi and Draca, Mirko and Fons-Rosen, Christian, Revolving Door Lobbyists (July 16, 2010). 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1641217 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641217