Revolving Door Lobbyists

58 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2010 Last revised: 14 Apr 2013

Jordi Blanes i Vidal

London School of Economics

Mirko Draca

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics; University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Christian Fons-Rosen

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Date Written: July 16, 2010

Abstract

Washington's `revolving door' -the movement from government service into the lobbying industry- is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.

Keywords: Lobbying, Revolving Door, US Congress, Political Connections, Political Elites

JEL Classification: H11, J24, J45

Suggested Citation

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi and Draca, Mirko and Fons-Rosen, Christian, Revolving Door Lobbyists (July 16, 2010). 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1641217 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641217

Jordi Blanes i Vidal (Contact Author)

London School of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 779 51 61 034 (Phone)

Mirko Draca

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+20 7955 7010 (Phone)

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Christian Fons-Rosen

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Paper statistics

Downloads
472
Rank
48,250
Abstract Views
2,525