Behavioral Economics and Abuse of Dominance – A Fresh Look at the Article 102 TFEU Case-Law

14 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010

See all articles by Nicolas Petit

Nicolas Petit

University of Liege - School of Law; Hoover Institution; University of South Australia - School of Law

Norman Neyrinck

University of Liege

Date Written: May 15, 2010

Abstract

The purpose of this working paper is to demonstrate that European competition lawyers – or at least most of them – do not need a shrink. More seriously, this paper underlines that a significant body of behavioral economics has already penetrated European Union (“EU”) competition law, in particular in the area of abuse of dominance. The case-law adopted pursuant to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) indeed exhibits a noticeable degree of sympathy for the insights of behavioral economics. This is true in relation to the two analytical steps involved in a finding of unlawful conduct, namely the assessment of dominance (I) and the identification of an abuse (II).

Keywords: Abuse of Dominance, Behavioral Economics, Market Definition, Bundling, Tying, Predatory Pricing

JEL Classification: K21, L4

Suggested Citation

Petit, Nicolas and Neyrinck, Norman, Behavioral Economics and Abuse of Dominance – A Fresh Look at the Article 102 TFEU Case-Law (May 15, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1641431 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641431

Nicolas Petit (Contact Author)

University of Liege - School of Law ( email )

B-4000 Liege
Belgium

Hoover Institution ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

University of South Australia - School of Law ( email )

GPO Box 2471
Adelaide SA 5001
Australia

Norman Neyrinck

University of Liege ( email )

B-4000 Liege
Belgium

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