The Effect of Mandated Quality Reporting on Outcomes and on Reporting: Evidence from Infection Reporting in Pennsylvania

57 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2010 Last revised: 19 Jan 2014

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Hyun K. Kim

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 17, 2014

Abstract

We contribute to two literatures. The first involves reputation markets, and whether public reporting of quality measures (here, hospital infection rates) leads to higher quality. The second involves performance reporting, and the impact of reporting rules on reporting. We find evidence of both effects for reporting of central-line associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) in Pennsylvania.

Our proxy for actual CLABSI rates uses inpatient data, which are not reported and unlikely to be gamed. Inpatient rate trends are similar in Pennsylvania and control states prior to period. During the reporting period, median PA rates drop by 21%, versus 3% in control states. The drop is strongest for hospitals in the top third of reported rates, for whom reporting provides stronger incentives to reduce infections. Publicly reported CLABSI rates fall by far more than inpatient rates. This difference suggests time-inconsistent public reporting and confirms the importance of using non-reported measures to measure the effect of performance reporting on quality.

Keywords: CLABSI, health-care reporting, infection rates, performance measurement

JEL Classification: I18, K32

Suggested Citation

Black, Bernard S. and Kim, Hyun K., The Effect of Mandated Quality Reporting on Outcomes and on Reporting: Evidence from Infection Reporting in Pennsylvania (January 17, 2014). Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 11-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1641459 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641459

Bernard S. Black

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brussels
Belgium

Hyun K. Kim (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

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