Inequality and Preferences for Redistribution in the Developing World

50 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 16 Nov 2014

See all articles by Stephan M. Haggard

Stephan M. Haggard

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS)

Robert Kaufman

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - Department of Political Science

James D. Long

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

We examine the sources of preferences for redistribution in 41 developing countries, with a multi-level model that shows the effect of individual-level and country-level predictors. We test hypotheses derived from Melzer-Richard expectations about the effects of income and sociological expectations about the effect of occupation and urban residence. We show that the preferences of the poor are cross-cut by sharp differences between unskilled and semi-skilled workers and those who work in the agricultural sector. At the country level, we find only very limited evidence that higher levels of economic inequality strengthen preferences for redistribution among the poor in general, although there is some indication that it affects the attitudes of those who live in large cities. The most consistent level-2 finding is that growth appears to diminish support for government intervention in support of the poor.

Keywords: inequality, redistributive preferences, Melzer and Richard

Suggested Citation

Haggard, Stephan M. and Kaufman, Robert and Long, James D., Inequality and Preferences for Redistribution in the Developing World (2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642249

Stephan M. Haggard (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States
858-534-5781 (Phone)
858-534-3939 (Fax)

Robert Kaufman

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - Department of Political Science ( email )

New Brunswick, NJ 08901
United States

James D. Long

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

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