Measuring Norms of Income Transfers: Trust Experiments and Survey Data from Vietnam

55 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 4 Sep 2010

See all articles by Tomomi Tanaka

Tomomi Tanaka

The World Bank

Colin Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Quang Nguyen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This paper compares the patterns of income transfers within village communities in the north and south of Vietnam by analyzing household survey and experimental data. The results of household data analysis show private transfers flow from high-income households to low-income households in the south where social safety net is limited. In contrast, private transfers do not correlate with pre-transfer income in the north where public transfers are more widespread. In addition, public transfers crowd out private transfers in the north. We conducted a trust game in both regions and found consistent results. People in the south are more altruistic toward the poor: they send more to the poor without expecting higher repayment. This pattern is consistent with the idea that private norms of redistribution from rich to poor are active in the south, but are crowded out in the north, possibly by communist public institutions, although we observe higher levels of trust and reciprocity in the north.

Suggested Citation

Tanaka, Tomomi and Camerer, Colin F. and Nguyen, Quang, Measuring Norms of Income Transfers: Trust Experiments and Survey Data from Vietnam (2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642530

Tomomi Tanaka (Contact Author)

The World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Colin F. Camerer

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-4054 (Phone)
626-432-1726 (Fax)

Quang Nguyen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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