A Note on Optimal Vote and Turnout Buying

Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 9 Sep 2013

See all articles by Agustin Casas

Agustin Casas

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) - Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros (CUNEF); Northwestern University

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

In this paper, we model a patron-client relationship where the incumbent may either persuade or mobilize voters; that is, he can pay citizens to vote for him - vote buying - or he can pay citizens to show up to vote - turnout buying - respectively. Furthermore, we are interested in the optimal budget allocation across groups of citizens, thus we focus on a single member, majoritarian election in a multi-district environment, where only the incumbent can engage in vote and turnout buying. Our findings enrich the distributive politics literature that frames the problem into swing vs. core states, by showing that (1) the distributive/clientelist game favors districts where more voters prefer the opposition party, resembling Dixit and Londregan (1996); (2) in every district, citizens who support the incumbent party (weakly or strongly) are the first target of its distributive/clientelist efforts, in line with Cox (2006); and (3) within those voters who receive transfers, mobilization occurs mainly across the weak supporters of the incumbent, while persuasion occurs across the weak opposers to the incumbent party, simultaneously.

Suggested Citation

Casas, Agustin, A Note on Optimal Vote and Turnout Buying (2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642669

Agustin Casas (Contact Author)

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) - Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros (CUNEF) ( email )

Serrano Anguita 9
Madrid, Madrid 28004
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/agustincasas/

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
526
PlumX Metrics