Negotiating Democracy: Exchange and Governance in Multiparty Presidential Regimes
39 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 8 Aug 2010
Date Written: August 5, 2010
We develop a formal model of exchange and governance in multiparty presidential regimes that simultaneously considers political transfers, monetary transfers, and policy concessions. The modeling results suggest that executives will use political transfers like cabinet positions in exchange for support from factions that are ideologically similar to the executive and will use monetary transfers like pork for ideologically distant factions within more heterogeneous voting coalitions. The use of political or monetary transfers also depends on the relative cost of each, which in turn depends on features of the institutional and bargaining environments. Additionally, the model suggests that an executive with greater relative bargaining power concedes less on policies or makes fewer transfers to achieve a particular policy outcome. Cross-national empirical evidence and a closer study of Brazil are supportive of model assertions and findings. Though applied specifically to multiparty presidential circumstances, the model permits extension to other regimes.
Keywords: Multiparty Presidential Regime, Coalition Management, Governability
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