Negotiating Democracy: Exchange and Governance in Multiparty Presidential Regimes

39 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 8 Aug 2010

See all articles by Luis F. Araujo

Luis F. Araujo

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Carlos Pereira

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)

Eric D. Raile

North Dakota State University

Date Written: August 5, 2010

Abstract

We develop a formal model of exchange and governance in multiparty presidential regimes that simultaneously considers political transfers, monetary transfers, and policy concessions. The modeling results suggest that executives will use political transfers like cabinet positions in exchange for support from factions that are ideologically similar to the executive and will use monetary transfers like pork for ideologically distant factions within more heterogeneous voting coalitions. The use of political or monetary transfers also depends on the relative cost of each, which in turn depends on features of the institutional and bargaining environments. Additionally, the model suggests that an executive with greater relative bargaining power concedes less on policies or makes fewer transfers to achieve a particular policy outcome. Cross-national empirical evidence and a closer study of Brazil are supportive of model assertions and findings. Though applied specifically to multiparty presidential circumstances, the model permits extension to other regimes.

Keywords: Multiparty Presidential Regime, Coalition Management, Governability

Suggested Citation

Araujo, Luis Fernando and Pereira, Carlos and Raile, Eric D., Negotiating Democracy: Exchange and Governance in Multiparty Presidential Regimes (August 5, 2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642920

Luis Fernando Araujo

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

101 Marshall Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-7583 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)

Carlos Pereira (Contact Author)

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) ( email )

R. Dr. Neto de Araujo 320 cj 1307
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro 22250-900
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://ebape.fgv.br/en/faculty-members/carlos-pereira

Eric D. Raile

North Dakota State University ( email )

Fargo, ND 58105
United States

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