Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 1999

Posted: 21 Sep 1999

See all articles by Martin Gaynor

Martin Gaynor

Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

Deborah Haas-Wilson

Smith College

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Abstract

The health care industry is being transformed. Rapid consolidation, taking the form of both mergers and acquisitions and rapidly shifting alliances and contractual relations, has led to a marked increase in concentration. Within the next few years, many markets are predicted to be dominated by a few large firms. Antitrust enforcement authorities as well as courts and legislators at both the federal and state levels are struggling with the implications of these changes for the nature and consequences of competition in health care markets. In this paper we summarize the nature of the changes in the structure of the health care industry, focusing on the markets for health insurance, hospital services, and physician services. We then discuss the potential implications of the restructuring of the health care industry for competition, efficiency, and public policy.

Note: This is a description of the article and not the actual abstract.

JEL Classification: I11, L1, L4

Suggested Citation

Gaynor, Martin and Haas-Wilson, Deborah, Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=164295

Martin Gaynor (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy
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Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

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Deborah Haas-Wilson

Smith College ( email )

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United States
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413-585-3635 (Fax)

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