Programmatic Political Parties and Public Sector Reform

31 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 15 Sep 2010

See all articles by Cesi Cruz

Cesi Cruz

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Political Science

Philip Keefer

Inter-American Development Bank

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

A large literature on the political economy of public sector organization asks how and when the legislature delegates authority to the public administration. We contribute to this literature by investigating a new question: under what conditions do politicians prefer a well-performing public administration, with transparent and rule-bound financial and personnel management? We argue that programmatic political parties play a central role, by facilitating collective action by political actors. Such politicians can be more easily held accountable for the implementation of broad public policies, prompting them to be more sensitive to the quality of public sector management. In addition, such politicians are better able to act collectively to enforce high standards of public administration on a reluctant executive. We find robust support for this claim with novel evidence: ratings of 511 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries are systematically higher in countries with programmatic political parties.

Keywords: Parties, Public Sector Reform, Bureaucracy, World Bank

Suggested Citation

Cruz, Cesi and Keefer, Philip, Programmatic Political Parties and Public Sector Reform (2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1642962

Cesi Cruz (Contact Author)

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Vancouver, V6T 1Z1
Canada

Philip Keefer

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

1300 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States
202-623-1961 (Phone)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
216
Abstract Views
1,490
rank
154,432
PlumX Metrics