Some Experimental Results for a Quantal Response Bargaining Model of War

33 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 5 Sep 2010

See all articles by David H. Clark

David H. Clark

Binghamton University

Timothy Nordstrom

University of Mississippi

Katri Sieberg

Tampere University

William L. Reed

Rice University - Department of Political Science

Charles A. Holt

University of Virginia - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

We provide the first experimental results on a two-stage model of militarized conflict based on the ubiquitous ultimatum bargaining game that dominates much of the theoretical analysis of international relations. We illustrate how data from experimental trials deviate from the equilibrium predictions from both a complete information version of the model and the quantal response version of the model. We discuss how the results from the experiments can inform future theoretical, empirical, and experimental work on bargaining theories of war.

Suggested Citation

Clark, David H. and Nordstrom, Timothy and Sieberg, Katri and Reed, William L. and Holt, Charles A., Some Experimental Results for a Quantal Response Bargaining Model of War (2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1643267

David H. Clark (Contact Author)

Binghamton University ( email )

Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States

Timothy Nordstrom

University of Mississippi ( email )

Oxford, MS 38677
United States

Katri Sieberg

Tampere University ( email )

Tampere, FIN-33101
Finland

William L. Reed

Rice University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

Charles A. Holt

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
Rouss Hall #114
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States
(804) 924-7894 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
69
Abstract Views
543
rank
331,744
PlumX Metrics