The Political Economy of Municipal Transfers: Evidence from Mexico

A considerably revised, final version should appear in Publius: The Journal of Federalism in early 2014.

51 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2010 Last revised: 7 Mar 2013

See all articles by Jeffrey F. Timmons

Jeffrey F. Timmons

NYU Abu Dhabi

Daniel S. Broid

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Urban Studies & Planning

Date Written: January 6, 2013

Abstract

How do fiscal institutions, partisanship and governance affect federal transfers to municipalities? We address this question using a novel research design and dataset for Mexico. We compare the state-level obligations for federal transfers to municipalities with the distribution of these funds as reported by municipalities. This strategy allows us to know whether state-level formulas are binding, whether there are partisan skews in the formula, and how and why governors re-allocate funds. We find that state-level fiscal institutions are quite binding; even so, deviations from the formula total approximately US$300-500M per year. Whereas PRI governors appear to re-allocate to municipalities when they are governed by their co-partisans, PAN and PRD governors appear to re-allocate funds to municipalities for equity, stabilization and disasters (with no detectable partisan bias).

Keywords: Municipal Transfers, Fiscal Federalism, Political Parties, Governance

Suggested Citation

Timmons, Jeffrey F. and Broid, Daniel S., The Political Economy of Municipal Transfers: Evidence from Mexico (January 6, 2013). A considerably revised, final version should appear in Publius: The Journal of Federalism in early 2014., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1643746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1643746

Jeffrey F. Timmons (Contact Author)

NYU Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
(971) 262 84523 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/academics/faculty/jeffrey-timmons.html

Daniel S. Broid

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Urban Studies & Planning ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
172
Abstract Views
895
rank
244,729
PlumX Metrics