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Independent Regulators: Theory, Evidence and Reform Proposals

32 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2010  

Francesc Trillas

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics; University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 31, 2010

Abstract

Regulatory independence has been proposed as a mechanism to alleviate the commitment problem associated to the sunk nature of investments in network industries. This paper summarizes the author's and others' work in this field (in a pause to take stock of several years of research) and, in addition, includes a new exercise that uses instrumental variables to endogenize both de jure and de facto regulatory independence. The institution of regulatory independence has costs as well as benefits; the positive and significant impact on industry performance is however most likely quantitatively modest. As a result of the empirical evidence and the assessment of the literature, some reform proposals are made to improve the effectiveness of the institution.

Keywords: regulation, independence, strategic delegation

JEL Classification: L51

Suggested Citation

Trillas, Francesc, Independent Regulators: Theory, Evidence and Reform Proposals (May 31, 2010). IESE Business School Working Paper No. 860. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1645199 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1645199

Francesc Trillas Jané (Contact Author)

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics ( email )

Avda. Diagonal 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

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