*You Get What You Pay for: Incentives and Selection in the Education System

16 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2010

See all articles by Thomas J. Dohmen

Thomas J. Dohmen

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Maastricht University - Business Investment Research Center (BIRC)

Armin Falk

briq - Institute on Behavior & Inequality

Abstract

We analyse worker self-selection, with a special focus on teachers, to explore whether worker composition is generally endogenous. We analyse laboratory experimental data to provide causal evidence on particular sorting patterns. Our field data analysis focuses specifically on selection patterns of teachers. We find that teachers are more risk averse than employees in other professions, indicating that relatively risk averse individuals sort into teaching occupations under the current system. Using survey measures on trust and reciprocity we find that teachers trust more and are less negatively reciprocal than other employees, and establish differences in personality based on the Big Five concept.

Suggested Citation

Dohmen, Thomas and Falk, Armin, *You Get What You Pay for: Incentives and Selection in the Education System. The Economic Journal, Vol. 120, Issue 546, pp. F256-F271, August 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1645553 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02376.x

Thomas Dohmen (Contact Author)

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Maastricht University - Business Investment Research Center (BIRC) ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31-43-388 3832 (Phone)
+31-43-388 4856 (Fax)

Armin Falk

briq - Institute on Behavior & Inequality

Schaumburg-Lippe-Stra├če 5-9
Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.briq-institute.org/

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