Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Conditionality?

Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Working Paper No. 104

32 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2010 Last revised: 9 Apr 2014

See all articles by Axel Dreher

Axel Dreher

Heidelberg University

Jan-Egbert Sturm

KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

James Raymond Vreeland

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Date Written: June 20, 2010

Abstract

We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council.

Keywords: IMF, UN Security Council, Voting, Aid, Conditionality

JEL Classification: O19, O11, F35

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Sturm, Jan-Egbert and Vreeland, James Raymond, Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Conditionality? (June 20, 2010). Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Working Paper No. 104. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1645891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1645891

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de

Jan-Egbert Sturm

KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich ( email )

Zurich
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.kof.ethz.ch

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

James Raymond Vreeland

Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.profvreeland.com

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