Performance in Private Equity: Are General Partnership Owners Important?
28 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2010
Date Written: January 20, 2010
Abstract
This study demonstrates that the ownership of private equity (PE) funds influences investment performance. The analysis focuses on the universe of PE investments made by Italian closed-end funds from 1999 to 2005. We find that bank-owned funds generally engage in weaker monitoring of the firms in which they invest, because their representatives hold a plurality of offices on boards of directors of such firms, whether PE-backed or not. This leads to lower revenue growth for portfolio firms, and consequently to lower IRR. On the contrary, corporate-owned funds are able to enforce closer supervision of their investments, leading to better performance.
Keywords: Private Equity, Performance, Ownership
JEL Classification: G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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