Cooperation Norms in Multiple-Stage Punishment

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Forthcoming

35 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2010 Last revised: 18 Jun 2011

See all articles by Andreas Nicklisch

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Irenaeus Wolff

University of Konstanz - TWI; CEREB

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 21, 2010

Abstract

We analyze the interplay between cooperation norms and people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game with multiple punishment stages. By combining multiple punishment stages with self-contained episodes of interaction, we are able to disentangle the effects of retaliation and norm-related punishment. An additional treatment provides information on the norms bystanders use in judging punishment actions. Partly confirming previous findings, punishment behavior and bystanders' opinions are guided by an absolute norm. This norm is consistent over decisions and punishment stages and requires full contributions. In the first punishment stage, our results suggest a higher personal involvement of punishers, leading to a non-linearity defined by the punishers' contribution. In later punishment stages, the personal-involvement effect vanishes and retaliation kicks in. Bystanders generally apply the same criteria as punishers in all stages.

Keywords: Experiment, Public-Good, Punishment, Social Norms, Voluntary Cooperation

JEL Classification: C92, D63, H41

Suggested Citation

Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus, Cooperation Norms in Multiple-Stage Punishment (July 21, 2010). Journal of Public Economic Theory, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1646410

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, D-20354
Germany

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

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Germany
49 228 9141679 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/nicklisch.html

Irenaeus Wolff (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz - TWI ( email )

Fach D-144
Universit├Ątsstra├če 10
Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

CEREB ( email )

Internationales Buro
Nordhaeuser Str. 63
D - 99089 Erfurt
Germany

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