20 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2010 Last revised: 28 Jan 2011
Date Written: July 1, 2010
Stock debates about transparency and secrecy usually assume that open voting and secret voting are mutually exclusive. But these positions present a false alternative; open and secret voting can be employed as complements in a larger decision-procedure. In what follows I will propose a hybrid or dual procedure of open-secret voting, and attempt to specify the conditions under which that procedure works well. I suggest that open-secret voting can best be justified as an institutional means of obtaining a second opinion from the voting group. A second opinion of this sort might produce informational benefits either for the members of the voting group itself, for outside parties, or for both. This is a companion paper to Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions, available on SSRN.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Vermeule, Adrian, Open-Secret Voting (July 1, 2010). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 674; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 10-37. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1646435 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1646435