Competition and Mergers Among Nonprofits

Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Forthcoming

18 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2010  

Jens Prufer

Tilburg University - CentER; Tilburg University - Department of Economics; Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 23, 2010

Abstract

Should mergers among nonprofit organizations be assessed differently than mergers among for-profit firms? A recent debate in law and economics, boosted by apparently one-sided court decisions, has produced the result that promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular objectives of producers. In this paper, I challenge the general validity of this result by showing that it may indeed depend on the particular objectives of producers whether a merger between two nonprofits is welfare decreasing or increasing. This implies that it is impossible to assess the net effects of a merger between two nonprofits without examining the objectives of the owners involved.

Keywords: Nonprofits, Mergers, Antitrust, Not-for-profit sector, Owner objectives

JEL Classification: L44, L31, L22, K21

Suggested Citation

Prufer, Jens, Competition and Mergers Among Nonprofits (July 23, 2010). Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1647608

Jens Prufer (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Paper statistics

Downloads
146
Rank
81,967
Abstract Views
818