Economic Natural Selection in Bertrand and Cournot Settings

Posted: 13 Aug 1999

See all articles by Burkhard Hehenkamp

Burkhard Hehenkamp

University of Paderborn

Cheng-Zhong Qin

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics

Charles Stuart

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium.

JEL Classification: D43, L13, C72

Suggested Citation

Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Qin, Cheng-Zhong and Stuart, Charles, Economic Natural Selection in Bertrand and Cournot Settings. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=164818

Burkhard Hehenkamp (Contact Author)

University of Paderborn ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
D-33098 Paderborn
United States

HOME PAGE: http://wiwi.uni-paderborn.de/dep4/lehrstuhl-prof-dr-hehenkamp/

Cheng-Zhong Qin

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

Charles Stuart

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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