Economic Natural Selection in Bertrand and Cournot Settings
Posted: 13 Aug 1999
Abstract
We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium.
JEL Classification: D43, L13, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Qin, Cheng-Zhong and Stuart, Charles, Economic Natural Selection in Bertrand and Cournot Settings. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=164818
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