How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015
Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, U.S. Naval War College; University of Virginia School of Law, Center for Oceans Law & Policy; University of Virginia School of Law, Center for National Security Law; University of California Berkeley School of Law; Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Orbis (Foreign Policy Research Institute), pp. 35-46, Winter 2001
Years of strategic missteps in oceans policy, naval strategy and a force structure in decline set the stage for U.S. defeat at sea in 2015. After decades of double-digit budget increases, the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) was operating some of the most impressive systems in the world, including a medium-range ballistic missile that could hit a moving aircraft carrier and a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was stealthier than U.S. nuclear submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force to visionary maritime strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all elements of national power promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea. The United States, in contrast, had a declining naval force structured around 10 aircraft carriers spread thinly throughout the globe. With a maritime strategy focused on lower order partnerships,and a national oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea. This article recounts how China destroyed the USS George Washington in the East China Sea in 2015. The political fallout from the disaster ended 75 years of U.S. dominance in the Pacific Ocean and cemented China’s position as the Asian hegemon.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: Great Power War, Sino-American War, U.S.-China, Pacific Security, U.S. Navy, Chinese Navy, Naval Warfare, Aircraft Carrier, Naval War, Asia, conflict
Date posted: July 26, 2010