Averting Nuclear Terrorism: Building a Global Regime of Cooperative Threat Reduction

Abstract

This article focuses on expanding the architecture of cooperative threat reduction for effective multilateral nuclear nonproliferation. It assesses the risk of nuclear terrorism, the history and main features of existing cooperative threat reduction programs, and some of the more difficult challenges facing them. Most of the obstacles to an effective regime of global cooperative threat reduction are bureaucratic and inertial rather than stemming from fundamental strategic disagreement. In order to build a more effective global regime of cooperative threat reduction, this article proposes five critical improvements: (1) Additional resources; (2) Increasing deterrence through fall-out forensics and “tagging” of radioactive isotopes and weapons-related materials; (3) Increasing the incentive structure that convince potential proliferators to abandon their projects; (4) Increasing highlevel engagement among nations through designation of Presidential level envoys; and, (5) Expanding the umbrella of cooperative threat reduction to include all nuclear weapons states and Pakistan in particular.