Averting Nuclear Terrorism: Building a Global Regime of Cooperative Threat Reduction

82 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2010

See all articles by James Kraska

James Kraska

Stockton Center for International Law, U.S. Naval War College; Harvard University - Harvard Law School; University of California Berkeley School of Law; Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)

Date Written: July, 25 2010

Abstract

This article focuses on expanding the architecture of cooperative threat reduction for effective multilateral nuclear nonproliferation. It assesses the risk of nuclear terrorism, the history and main features of existing cooperative threat reduction programs, and some of the more difficult challenges facing them. Most of the obstacles to an effective regime of global cooperative threat reduction are bureaucratic and inertial rather than stemming from fundamental strategic disagreement. In order to build a more effective global regime of cooperative threat reduction, this article proposes five critical improvements: (1) Additional resources; (2) Increasing deterrence through fall-out forensics and “tagging” of radioactive isotopes and weapons-related materials; (3) Increasing the incentive structure that convince potential proliferators to abandon their projects; (4) Increasing highlevel engagement among nations through designation of Presidential level envoys; and, (5) Expanding the umbrella of cooperative threat reduction to include all nuclear weapons states and Pakistan in particular.

Suggested Citation

Kraska, James, Averting Nuclear Terrorism: Building a Global Regime of Cooperative Threat Reduction (July, 25 2010). American University International Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 703, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1648646

James Kraska (Contact Author)

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